Media Summary: James Mickens, Harvard University Q: Why Do Keynote Speakers Keep Suggesting That Improving Sinisa Matetic ETH Zurich Abstract: We introduce a new concept called brokered delegation. Brokered delegation allows users to ... An Empirical Study of Web Resource Manipulation in Real-world Mobile Applications Xiaohan Zhang Fudan University Abstract: ...

Usenix Security 18 With Great - Detailed Analysis & Overview

James Mickens, Harvard University Q: Why Do Keynote Speakers Keep Suggesting That Improving Sinisa Matetic ETH Zurich Abstract: We introduce a new concept called brokered delegation. Brokered delegation allows users to ... An Empirical Study of Web Resource Manipulation in Real-world Mobile Applications Xiaohan Zhang Fudan University Abstract: ... Mark O'Neil Brigham Young University 2018 Internet Defense Prize First Runner Up Abstract: SSL/TLS libraries are notoriously ... The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness in the Windows Code-Signing PKI Doowon Kim University of Maryland, ... Hang Hu Virginia Tech Abstract: Spear phishing has been a persistent threat to users and organizations, and yet email providers ...

Jonathan Frankle Massachusetts Institute of Technology Abstract: The US federal court system is exploring ways to improve the ... Dongliang Mu The Pennsylvania State University Abstract: Today's software systems are increasingly relying on the “power of the ... Sinisa Matetic ETH Zuric Abstract: We introduce a new concept called brokered delegation. Brokered delegation allows users to ... Amit Elazari Bar On Doctoral Candidate, Berkeley Law, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity Grantee Abstract: Bug Bounties are ... All Your GPS Are Belong To Us: Towards Stealthy Manipulation of Road Navigation Systems Kexiong (Curtis) Zeng Virginia Tech ... Malicious Management Unit: Why Stopping Cache Attacks in Software is Harder Than You Think Stephan van Schaik Vrije ...

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USENIX Security '18 - With Great Training Comes Great Vulnerability...
USENIX Security '18-Q: Why Do Keynote Speakers Keep Suggesting That Improving Security Is Possible?
USENIX Security '18 - DelegaTEE: Brokered Delegation Using Trusted Execution Environments
USENIX Security '18 - An Empirical Study of Web Resource Manipulation in Real-world Mobile Apps...
USENIX Security '18 - The Secure Socket API: TLS as an Operating System Service
USENIX Security '18 - The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness...
USENIX Security '18 - End-to-End Measurements of Email Spoofing Attacks
USENIX Security '18 - Practical Accountability of Secret Processes
USENIX Security '18 - Understanding the Reproducibility of Crowd-reported Security Vulnerabilities
USENIX Security '18 - DelegaTEE: Brokered Delegation Using Trusted Execution Environments
USENIX Security '18 - The Law and Economics of Bug Bounties
USENIX Security '18 - All Your GPS Are Belong To Us...
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USENIX Security '18 - With Great Training Comes Great Vulnerability...

USENIX Security '18 - With Great Training Comes Great Vulnerability...

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USENIX Security '18-Q: Why Do Keynote Speakers Keep Suggesting That Improving Security Is Possible?

USENIX Security '18-Q: Why Do Keynote Speakers Keep Suggesting That Improving Security Is Possible?

James Mickens, Harvard University Q: Why Do Keynote Speakers Keep Suggesting That Improving

USENIX Security '18 - DelegaTEE: Brokered Delegation Using Trusted Execution Environments

USENIX Security '18 - DelegaTEE: Brokered Delegation Using Trusted Execution Environments

Sinisa Matetic ETH Zurich Abstract: We introduce a new concept called brokered delegation. Brokered delegation allows users to ...

USENIX Security '18 - An Empirical Study of Web Resource Manipulation in Real-world Mobile Apps...

USENIX Security '18 - An Empirical Study of Web Resource Manipulation in Real-world Mobile Apps...

An Empirical Study of Web Resource Manipulation in Real-world Mobile Applications Xiaohan Zhang Fudan University Abstract: ...

USENIX Security '18 - The Secure Socket API: TLS as an Operating System Service

USENIX Security '18 - The Secure Socket API: TLS as an Operating System Service

Mark O'Neil Brigham Young University 2018 Internet Defense Prize First Runner Up Abstract: SSL/TLS libraries are notoriously ...

USENIX Security '18 - The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness...

USENIX Security '18 - The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness...

The Broken Shield: Measuring Revocation Effectiveness in the Windows Code-Signing PKI Doowon Kim University of Maryland, ...

USENIX Security '18 - End-to-End Measurements of Email Spoofing Attacks

USENIX Security '18 - End-to-End Measurements of Email Spoofing Attacks

Hang Hu Virginia Tech Abstract: Spear phishing has been a persistent threat to users and organizations, and yet email providers ...

USENIX Security '18 - Practical Accountability of Secret Processes

USENIX Security '18 - Practical Accountability of Secret Processes

Jonathan Frankle Massachusetts Institute of Technology Abstract: The US federal court system is exploring ways to improve the ...

USENIX Security '18 - Understanding the Reproducibility of Crowd-reported Security Vulnerabilities

USENIX Security '18 - Understanding the Reproducibility of Crowd-reported Security Vulnerabilities

Dongliang Mu The Pennsylvania State University Abstract: Today's software systems are increasingly relying on the “power of the ...

USENIX Security '18 - DelegaTEE: Brokered Delegation Using Trusted Execution Environments

USENIX Security '18 - DelegaTEE: Brokered Delegation Using Trusted Execution Environments

Sinisa Matetic ETH Zuric Abstract: We introduce a new concept called brokered delegation. Brokered delegation allows users to ...

USENIX Security '18 - The Law and Economics of Bug Bounties

USENIX Security '18 - The Law and Economics of Bug Bounties

Amit Elazari Bar On Doctoral Candidate, Berkeley Law, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity Grantee Abstract: Bug Bounties are ...

USENIX Security '18 - All Your GPS Are Belong To Us...

USENIX Security '18 - All Your GPS Are Belong To Us...

All Your GPS Are Belong To Us: Towards Stealthy Manipulation of Road Navigation Systems Kexiong (Curtis) Zeng Virginia Tech ...

USENIX Security '18 - Malicious Management Unit: Why Stopping Cache Attacks in Software...

USENIX Security '18 - Malicious Management Unit: Why Stopping Cache Attacks in Software...

Malicious Management Unit: Why Stopping Cache Attacks in Software is Harder Than You Think Stephan van Schaik Vrije ...